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Abstract
In the Roman Catholic Church, the pope is elected by the (cardi-
nal) electors through “scrutiny,” where each elector casts an anony-
mous nomination. Using historical documents, we argue that a guid-
ing principle for the church has been the protection of electors from
the temptation to defy God through dishonest nomination. Based
on axiomatic analysis involving this principle, we recommend that
the church overturn the changes of Pope Pius XII (1945) to reinstate
the scrutiny of Pope Gregory XV (1621), and argue that random-
ization in the case of deadlock merits consideration.
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1 Introduction
Dominentur nobis regulae, non regulis dominemur: simus sub-
jecti canonibus, cum canonum praecepta servamus.1
Every hierarchical institution that spans generations faces the question
of succession: when the top office becomes vacant, how may it be occu-
pied? Prominent answers throughout history include the hereditary laws
of monarchies (from kingdoms to empires to sultanates) and the general
elections of republics. But what if the monarchs are celibate, and what if
the institution teaches students who are not allowed to vote? This is the
case for the (Roman) Catholic Church,2 an institution boasting a member-
ship today of over one billion. Its highest office is the papacy, the office
of the pope,3 whose absolute authority among Catholics is founded on the
dogma that he is the successor of Saint Peter.4 In recent decades there
has been a flurry of changes to the laws governing this succession, and our
objective is to identify the underlying concerns in order to offer a proposal
to the Catholic Church through axiomatic analysis.
The current practice is for the pope to be elected at a seclusive meet-
ing of the cardinals known as a (papal) conclave. While conclaves have
been standard for over seven centuries,5 modern conclave law is defined
by documents written in the last twenty-five years.6 In summary, the vot-
1Quoted from the epistle of Pope Celestine I to the bishops of Illyricum (Pope Ce-
lestine I, 428). My translation: “The rules should govern us, not the other way around:
we should be submitted to the canons while we safeguard their principles.”
2The term catholic derives from the Greek katholikos, meaning “universal,” and sev-
eral churches call themselves catholic. For brevity, we abuse language, using Catholic as
shorthand for Roman Catholic.
3The papacy is also called the Apostolic See; the pope is also called the
Bishop of Rome; the succession of the pope is also called the passing of the keys.
4Quoting the 1965 Dogmatic Constitution of the Church (Pope Paul VI, 1964):
“[ . . . ]the Roman Pontiff has full, supreme and universal power over the Church[ . . . ]For
our Lord placed Simon [who became Saint Peter] alone as the rock and the bearer of
keys of the Church, and made him shepherd of the whole flock[ . . . ]” This refers to a
quote of Jesus in the Bible (Matthew 16:18-19).
5The papal conclave was first made a requirement for papal elections in the thirteenth
century (Pope Gregory X, 1274). Though the practice was briefly suspended, it has
remained law ever since its reinstatement by Pope Celestine V (Pope Celestine V, 1294),
a hermit who was made pope and resigned within six months only to be imprisoned
until death by his successor. Incidentally, the next pope to resign of his own accord also
changed conclave law; this was Pope Benedict XVI, who resigned in 2013.
6The canon law governing conclaves is defined by the constitution Universi Dominici
2
ers are the (cardinal) electors—cardinals who are not yet eighty when the
papacy becomes vacant—and they are isolated from the rest of the world
for the duration of the election. Great measures are taken to keep them
secluded when voting at the Sistine Chapel, when lodged at the Domus
Sancta Marthae, and when traveling between the two. The election con-
sists of a series of scrutinies, where each elector anonymously submits a
ballot nominating one person. If someone receives at least two-thirds of
the nominations and gives his assent, then he is the new pope, while if
there is no such person, the ballots are burned with damp straw to create
black smoke and another scrutiny is scheduled. After either thirty-three
or thirty-four failed scrutinies (depending on whether or not the election
begins on the afternoon of the first day),7 the two who received the most
nominations in this final scrutiny8 become finalists. Thereafter, at each
deadlock scrutiny (our term), these finalists do not vote and the other elec-
tors may only nominate one of them, and this continues until a finalist
receives at least two-thirds of the nominations to become the pope.
Recent popes have attended to a number of facets of conclave law, in-
cluding who can vote,9 alternative election methods,10 whether a secular
Gregis (Pope John Paul II, 1996) and two amendments (Pope Benedict XVI, 2007; Pope
Benedict XVI, 2013).
7Though this is the usual reading, it may be inaccurate. The amended Clause 75
regarding two finalists (Pope Benedict XVI, 2013) is enacted according to the original
constitution (Pope John Paul II, 1996). By Clause 74, this occurs after three series
of seven scrutinies, which in turn occur after three days of scrutinies as described in
Clauses 62-73. According to Clause 63: “Should the election begin on the afternoon of
the first day, only one [scrutiny] is to be held; then, on the following days, if no one was
elected on the first [scrutiny], two [scrutinies] shall be held in the morning and two in the
afternoon.” One reading is that the first three days either consist of 1+4+4 scrutinies
or 4+4+4 scrutinies, in which case the two-finalist clause is enacted either after thirty
or thirty-three failed scrutinies.
8It is not specified what happens if there is not a unique pair with the most nomi-
nations, as in the case of (for example) a three-way tie.
9Pope Paul VI introduced the age restriction for cardinals to be electors (Pope Paul
VI, 1970; Pope Paul VI, 1975); Duffy (1997) proposes that this was to reduce the
influence of cardinals appointed by Pope Pius XII.
10Pope Pius X (1904b) abolished accessus, where immediately after a scrutiny each
elector may replace his nomination with one for a current nominee. Pope John Paul
II (1996) abolished (i) acclamation, where the electors simultaneously and unanimously
declare aloud the new pope, and (ii) compromise, where the electors unanimously agree
on a small subset of themselves to be representatives, and at least two-thirds of these
representatives nominate the new pope.
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ruler can veto a candidate,11 the structure of scrutiny,12 and how to han-
dle deadlock.13 Despite some vacillation on these topics, there has been
an unambiguous trend toward a series of scrutinies with a special elec-
tion method for deadlock. We therefore restrict attention to such conclave
formats, separately addressing (i) the structure of scrutiny, and (ii) how
deadlock should be handled.
In forming our proposal, we pursue an approach that is subtly different
from the standard one for axiomatic analysis of institutions: we do not
address the normative question of which principles our institution should
hold, but rather the positive question of which principles it does hold. This
distinction merits emphasis because addressing the normative question has
been essential to many recent applications of mechanism design to specific
institutions—from the advocacy of efficiency in response to unnecessary
deaths due to untraded donor kidneys (Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver, 2004),
to the advocacy of strategy-proofness in response to the gaming of chil-
dren’s futures in school choice (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999; Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez, 1999; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003), to the advocacy of
respecting improvements in response to the deliberate exam-failing of mili-
tary cadets seeking their top branches (So¨nmez, 2013; So¨nmez and Switzer,
2013). But in each of these cases economists began by observing a feature
of the status quo that could be uncontroversially described as perverse, and
that is not the case here—due to the seclusion of the conclave, all that we
can observe is the outcome, and we do not claim that the modern conclave
selects popes poorly. We simply observe a lack of conviction in the mod-
ern conclave suggested by recent changes, and we seek not to propose new
principles for the Catholic Church but rather to help the church on the
11Pope Pius X (1904a) abolished the jus exclusivae: the right for a head of state
to announce, through a cardinal, that he vetoed a particular candidate. It was last
used in the 1903 conclave, which elected the pope who abolished it, when Emperor
Franz Joseph I of Austria vetoed Cardinal Rampolla. Lonyay (1949) proposes that
Rampolla was vetoed because over a decade earlier he had opposed the Christian burial
of the emperor’s first heir, Crown Prince Rudolf, on the grounds of his apparent suicide.
Incidentally, the same emperor had another heir whose sudden death sparked conflict:
Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
12There have been changes to the ballot layout, the winning threshold, and whether
or not an elector may vote for himself—as we shall discuss in detail.
13Having abolished the remaining alternatives to scrutiny, Pope John Paul II (1996)
introduced deadlock scrutinies with simple majority. Pope Benedict XVI (2013) raised
the threshold to two-thirds of the electors.
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basis of its own principles.14
In Section 2, using decrees of ecumenical councils, conclave law, church
ceremonies, and other historical writings, we argue that a guiding principle
for conclave design is that electors should be protected from the temptation
to defy God: despite being the living men best-trained to let God speak
through them, the electors are but men, and therefore sinners, and therefore
imperfect instruments through which God may communicate. Specifically,
an elector is called to nominate the person he believes God would have
him nominate, and the Holy Spirit may reveal this person to him, yet
the elector may face temptation to sin by instead nominating another.
The conclave’s defining feature, its absolute seclusion, serves to protect
electors from outside influences, but this does not provide protection from
one’s peers or from one’s self. We argue that these additional protections
were provided by the scrutiny of 1621-1945 (Pope Gregory XV, 1621; Pope
Gregory XV, 1622), but since then electors have been unprotected from
the temptation of personal ambition due to a simplification of the ballot
layout (Pope Pius XII, 1945).
In Section 3, we analyze scrutiny by adapting a recent model (Holz-
man and Moulin, 2013) to allow the possibility of declaring the election
inconclusive with black smoke. Protection from peers and self are then
translated into axioms:
• Voters in elections across the world are protected from the bribes and
threats of peers through the use of anonymous ballots (Holzman and
Moulin, 2013), and scrutiny should be no different.
• Personal ambition for the papal tiara might tempt an elector to vote
not as he believes God would have him, but to instead vote in hopes
of crowning himself. This possibility may be completely avoided if
the scrutiny is impartial, which means that election of a given elector
14If anything, principles have typically flowed in the opposite direction, from religions
to economists, and for evidence one need not look beyond the axiomatic literature. The
analysis of claims problems, where an arbitrator must divide an estate among over-
promised heirs, began with careful consideration of recommendations from the Talmud
(O’Neill, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, 1985). The distillation of axioms and game-
theoretic foundations from these recommendations inspired a vast literature whose find-
ings now fill a book (Thomson, 2006); for a recent survey, see Thomson (2015).
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is decided solely by the votes of his peers (de Clippel, Moulin, and
Tideman, 2008; Holzman and Moulin, 2013).
To define our focal class of scrutinies, let n denote the number of electors.
A supermajority scrutiny is specified by a number greater than 1
2
n but no
greater than n called its threshold; if somebody receives at least this many
votes, he is elected; otherwise, there is black smoke. Both the modern
scrutiny and the scrutiny of 1621-1945 are supermajority scrutinies with
threshold 2
3
n; the difference is that the former allows self-nomination while
the latter does not.
We first analyze the modern format, and our findings are disappoint-
ing. Not only does the modern scrutiny violate impartiality, but so long as
self-nomination is allowed, the only scrutinies which satisfy both impartial-
ity and anonymous ballots are constant: the nominations may as well be
discarded before they are read. Our conclusion is that the current scrutiny
is deficient, and that moreover a simple adjustment to the processing of
ballots will not suffice to repair it; the format must be changed.
We then analyze the format where self-nomination is prohibited—which
was used for over three centuries—and here our findings are much more
encouraging. Using additional axioms capturing that messages should be
interpreted as nominations, that consensus should be respected, and that
electors should be treated symmetrically, we provide three tight charac-
terizations of supermajority scrutinies. We therefore not only endorse the
format of 1621-1945, but also endorse the particular scrutiny used during
that period.
In Section 4, we focus on deadlock. After providing several criticisms
of the current practice, we use the principles we have identified, previous
results in the literature (Holzman and Moulin, 2013; Mackenzie, 2015), and
a passage from the Bible to argue that randomization merits consideration.
Section 5 concludes.
6
2 Historical analysis
2.1 The 1945 laws of Pius XII
The greatest vacillation in recent conclave law has concerned the minimum
number of votes required to be elected pope. The threshold was 2
3
n in 1945,
as it had been for over seven centuries, when Pope Pius XII increased it to
2
3
n + 1 (Pope Pius XII, 1945). His direct successor reinstated the original
threshold (Pope John XXIII, 1962), but his direct successor reinstated the
increase (Pope Paul VI, 1975). The next pope, John Paul I, did not address
the topic in the thirty-three days between his coronation and his death, but
the next pope reinstated the 2
3
n threshold once again (Pope John Paul II,
1996). What was this about?
The 2
3
n threshold, which predates the conclave itself, was originally a
measure to protect the church from schism. It was first introduced at an
ecumenical council: a formal gathering of important members of the church
across the world to authoritatively settle critical matters. These are rare
events, with only twenty-one of them recognized by the Catholic Church in
its entire history, and by Catholic dogma their decrees are infallible (that
is, immune to human error).15 The 2
3
n threshold was decreed as the first
canon of the Third Lateran Council; as translated in Pope Alexander III
(1179):
Although clear enough decrees have been handed down by our
predecessors to avoid dissensions in the choice of a sovereign
pontiff, nevertheless in spite of these, because through wicked
and reckless ambition the church has often suffered se-
rious division, we too, in order to avoid this evil, on the advice
of our brethren and with the approval of the sacred council, have
decided that some addition must be made. Therefore we decree
that if[ . . . ]there cannot be full agreement among the cardinals
on a successor to the papacy[ . . . ]that person shall be held as
Roman pontiff who has been chosen and received by the two
thirds.
15The dogma of conciliar infallibility was most recently stated at the latest ecumenical
council, the Second Vatican Council (Pope Paul VI, 1964, Clause 25, second paragraph).
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That protection from schism was a priority for this particular council is
not surprising. The presiding pope, Alexander III, had just reconciled
with Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I, who had named three anti-popes—
popes that Catholics today do not recognize—against him.16 The decree
achieved its objective with remarkable success, as more than eight centuries
have passed without a schism caused by different factions of cardinals simul-
taneously electing different popes. Though there were later schisms caused
by other sorts of internal conflicts,17 it has been over half a millennium
since the last serious schism.
Why, then, was the threshold changed in 1945? Was it due to the
extraordinary circumstances of the times? We reject this as unlikely. It is
true that Pius XII reigned in Vatican City, a sovereign nation within the
city of Rome, and that this city was occupied during World War II—both
by the Axis in 1943 and by the Allies in 1944. But the threshold change
did not at all impact secular influence in conclave, and the next popes
continued to address this topic in the decades following the war.
Our hypothesis is that Pius XII changed the threshold as part of his
response to a 1904 conclave change of Pius X (Pope Pius X, 1904b). Pre-
viously, ballots featured signatures and codes: each elector wrote not only
the name of his nominee, but also his own name and an identifying phrase.
This additional information was concealed for scrutiny, but was used in a
post-scrutiny method of election called accessus: each elector could go to
his ballot, prove that it was his, and recast it for someone else who had
been nominated. The purpose of accessus was to help the electors reach a
consensus more quickly, but it proved more inconvenient than helpful, as
Pius X explained when he abolished it in 1904.
Without accessus, ballots were used only for scrutiny, and it seems that
Pius XII simplified the ballots to only include nominees for this reason.
A side effect of this simplification was that the prohibition against self-
16Frederick I was known as Barbarossa, or “Red Beard.” He reconciled with Alexan-
der III only upon his defeat at the Battle of Legnano.
17The Western Schism occurred when the very cardinals who elected Pope Urban VI
claimed they did so under duress and then crowned Antipope Clement VII in 1378;
over the course of this schism, there were additional elections of antipopes. Another
schism occurred when Antipope Felix V was crowned in 1439 during the reign of Pope
Eugene IV by a council that claimed it was ecumenical, and that moreover the authority
of an ecumenical council was greater than that of the pope.
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nomination became unenforceable, and there is evidence that this was the
reason for the threshold change. In Clause 68 of his constitution, Pius XII
explains that the purpose of the threshold increase is to avoid any occasion
of doubt that the vote of the winner is among the two-thirds that elect him
(Pope Pius XII, 1945),18 citing Aeterni Patris (Pope Gregory XV, 1621).
2.2 The 1621-1622 laws of Gregory XV
As the first thorough constitutions governing the election of a pope written
by a pope, Aeterni Patris (Pope Gregory XV, 1621) and Decet Romanum
Pontificem (Pope Gregory XV, 1622) form the foundation of the modern
conclave. As cited in Pope Pius XII (1945), Clauses 2-3 of Aeterni Patris
indeed decree that the winner should not be counted among the two-thirds
that elect him. But they then go further, decreeing that self-nomination is
prohibited: nobody, whether in scrutiny, compromise, or accessus, should
choose to vote for himself in any way. What was the reason for this?
Our explanation relies on the principle that each elector’s vote is sup-
posed to be guided by the Holy Spirit, a principle for which there is much
evidence in the current constitution (Pope John Paul II, 1996). The older
cardinals who are not electors should be “supporting the work of the elec-
tors with fervent prayers and supplications to the Holy Spirit and imploring
for them [the electors] the light needed to make their choice before God
alone and with concern only for the salvation of souls, which in the Church
must always be the supreme law” (introduction; Clause 85). The electors
themselves invoke the Holy Spirit for help with the chant of Veni Creator
as they enter the Sistine Chapel (Clause 50), which is the location for vot-
ing because “the electors can more easily dispose themselves to accept the
interior movements of the Holy Spirit” as there “everything is conducive
to an awareness of the presence of God” (introduction; Clause 51).
We propose that Gregory XV prohibited self-nomination out of concern
that an elector could be tempted to resist the Holy Spirit—that is, the Holy
Spirit might communicate to an elector whom he should nominate only for
that elector to instead nominate another. There is much evidence of this
18For the reader who consults the original Latin: in the same sentence, Pius XII states
that this should be true both in scrutiny and in compromise, and goes on to specify that
if the winner is an elector, he should still be counted in calculating the threshold.
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indirectly in the laws of conclave, as we shall discuss, but there is also direct
evidence in a ceremony that has been observed in conclaves ever since the
prohibition: the oath that (with small modifications) appears in Clause 5
of Pope Gregory XV (1621), Clause 67 of Pope Pius X (1904b), Clause 78
of Pope Pius XII (1945), Clause 68 of Pope Paul VI (1975), and Clause 66
of Pope John Paul II (1996). In the current constitution, it reads:
I call as my witness Christ the Lord who will be my judge, that
my vote is given to the one who before God I think should be
elected.
This oath, said by each elector before he casts his ballot, is a direct ac-
knowledgment in the church’s constitutions that even a cardinal at a papal
conclave might believe God would have him do one thing but instead do
another.
Temptation to deviate from God’s choice could come from outside of
conclave, from another elector, or from one’s self. There is strong evidence
that each is a grave concern for the church.
• Temptation from outsiders. Throughout the centuries, secular rulers
such as kings and emperors have had great interest in the choice of
pope. The conclave’s defining feature, its absolute seclusion, serves
to protect the electors from outside influence. In the current consti-
tution, anybody who violates the secrecy of the conclave is punished
severely by automatic excommunication,19 as is anybody who so much
as hints at the preferences of a secular ruler while in conclave.20
19From Clause 58 of Pope John Paul II (1996): “[ . . . ][those] who directly or indirectly
could in any way violate secrecy—whether by words or writing, by signs or in any other
way—are absolutely obliged to avoid this, lest they incur the penalty of excommunication
latae setentiae[ . . . ]
20From Clause 80 of Pope John Paul II (1996): “[ . . . ]I wish to confirm the provisions
made by my Predecessors for the purpose of excluding any external interference in the
election of the Supreme Pontiff. Therefore, in virtue of holy obedience and under pain of
excommunication latae setentiae, I again forbid each and every Cardinal elector[ . . . ]to
accept under any pretext whatsoever, from any civil authority whatsoever, the task of
proposing the veto or the so-called exclusiva, even under the guise of a simple desire,
or to reveal such either to the entire electoral body assembled together or to individual
electors, in writing or by word of mouth, either directly and personally or indirectly
through others, both before the election begins and for its duration.”
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• Temptation from peers. Bribes in papal elections fall under the sin of
simony,21 the topic of the first canon of the Second Lateran Council.
As translated in Pope Innocent II (1139):
We decree that if anyone has been ordained simoniacally,
he is to forfeit entirely the office which he illicitly usurped.
Though accusations of simony in papal elections are unsurprisingly
controversial, some have gained broad acceptance in modern cul-
ture.22 Today, simony is punished by automatic excommunication,23
as is participation in any kind of voting pact.24
• Temptation from self. The concern is an elector who does not be-
lieve he is the best choice for the church, but nevertheless selfishly
covets the papacy, as such an elector might be convinced—whether
or not it is true—that instead of sharing his honest opinion he can
cast the decisive vote for himself. Such a concern is suggested as
early as the fourth century by a historian, whose translated report
reads, “[ . . . ]men who covet this office [the papacy] in order to fulfill
their ambitions may well struggle for it with every resource at their
disposal” (Marcellinus, circa 352), and echoes the statement in the
canon of the Third Lateran Council that the church suffers through
“wicked and reckless ambition.” We interpret the prohibition of self-
nomination as a response to this concern.
21More broadly, the sin of simony covers the exchange of the spiritual for the temporal.
The sin is named for Simon Magus, who according to the Bible offered the apostles Peter
and John money in exchange for the ability to impart the Holy Spirit to others through
touch (Acts 8:9-24). The Catholic view that it is sinful to make such an exchange might
help explain why some transactions today are considered repugnant (Roth, 2007), such
as organ sales and prostitution.
22Perhaps most notable is Cardinal Borgia who was elected Pope Alexander VI in
1492, as evidenced by his recent portrayals in three recent television series (The Borgias,
1981; The Borgias, 2011-2013; Borgia: Faith and Fear, 2011-2014) and two recent video
games (Assassin’s Creed II, 2009; Assassin’s Creed: Brotherhood, 2010).
23From Clause 78 of Pope John Paul II (1996): “If—God forbid—in the election of
the Roman Pontiff the crime of simony were to be perpetrated, I decree and declare
that all those guilty thereof shall incur excommunication latae setentiae.”
24From Clause 81 of Pope John Paul II (1996): “The Cardinal electors shall further
abstain from any form of pact, agreement, promise or other commitment of any kind
which could oblige them to give or deny their vote to a person or persons[ . . . ]and I
hereby impose the penalty of excommunication latae sententiae upon those who violate
this prohibition.”
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The simplest approach to controlling a particular elector—a promise or
threat conditional on how he votes—should not be available to anybody
outside the conclave because it requires information that is unobservable.
Similarly, an elector can be protected from the bribes or threats of his peers
in the same way that voters in elections across the world are: through use
of a secret ballot. Finally, an elector can be protected from temptation
due to personal ambition if whether or not he becomes pope is determined
solely by his peers; this is the case for supermajority scrutinies precisely
when self-nomination is prohibited. But this raises a puzzle: if a secret
ballot is used, how can this prohibition be enforced?25
Gregory XV provided a clever solution through the design of a ballot
that allowed an elector to sign and then conceal his signature (Figure 1). In
the exceptional event that an elector received exactly the minimum number
of votes required to win, the signatures would be checked to verify that he
did not nominate himself; otherwise there was no need. Thus in scrutiny, a
new pope was determined using a secret ballot, while the signatures were
used exclusively for enforcement of the self-nomination prohibition.
When Pius XII simplified the ballot layout, he made the prohibition
against self-nomination unenforceable, and for the first time in the history
of the church, the first canon of the Third Lateran Council was incompat-
ible with Clauses 2-3 of Aeterni Patris. Because 2
3
n nominations became
unequal to 2
3
n peer nominations, an ancient ecumenical council became
incompatible with the founding documents of the modern conclave, result-
ing in church law vacillation where popes directly contradicted their direct
predecessors. That said, we will see that axiomatic analysis involving the
church’s principles leads to a proposal where the Third Lateran Council
and the decrees of Gregory XV are once again reconciled.
25Though we view secret voting as protection from bribes and threats, others have
viewed public voting as protection against strategic voting when voters know each other.
This debate goes back at least to Ramon Lull and Nicolas of Cusa, over five centuries
before Condorcet and Borda (McLean, 1990).
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Figure 1: The ballot layout of Pope Gregory XV (1622) as printed in 1692. The left
image shows the front of the ballot, where the elector writes. The right image shows
the back, which is left alone; the image is in fact misprinted, as Nomen [Name] should
be at the bottom and Signa [Emblems] should be at the top. Note that if two ballots
were placed next to each other, one showing the front and one showing the back, the
horizontal lines would not align. To go from the left image to the right, flip the ballot
not as a page of a book, but by rotating it about its top. The middle column of the
front has five rows. In the top row is printed Ego Card. [I, Cardinal...]; here the elector
writes his own name. In the middle row is printed Eligo in Summum Pontificem R.
D. meum D. Cardin. [...choose for the Most Reverend Lord Supreme Pontiff my Lord
Cardinal...]; here the elector writes his nominee. The bottom row is blank; here the
elector writes a code which is used in accessus. After completing his ballot, the elector
folds along the top and bottom horizontal lines of the front so that his own name and
his code are concealed but his nominee is not. The ballot is then sealed.
3 Scrutiny design
3.1 Model
We analyze two formats of scrutiny, both of which consist of:
• a finite set of electors, N ≡ {1, 2, ..., i, j, k, ..., n}, n ≥ 3,
• the black smoke, denoted 0, and
• a list of ballot spaces, (Bi)i∈N , where for each i ∈ N , Bi ⊆ N .
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As in the modern conclave, the black smoke is an outside option declaring
the scrutiny inconclusive. Each elector i selects a nominee xi from his
ballot space Bi. To keep our analysis focused on the central ideas of this
article, we forbid the nomination of non-electors. Though this restriction
is not law, the nomination of non-electors was for many years discouraged
(see Figure 1), and a non-cardinal has not been elected since Urban VI in
1378. More importantly, this restriction has no impact on the message of
our article; it simply allows our main findings to be stated more directly.
The two formats we model, that of Pius XII (1945 to present) and
that of Gregory XV (1621-1945), are distinguished by whether or not self-
nomination is permitted:
• Piusine26 format: for each i ∈ N , Bi ≡ N , and
• Gregorian format: for each i ∈ N , Bi ≡ N\{i}.
When black smoke is disallowed, our model of the Gregorian format coin-
cides with the model of Holzman and Moulin (2013); we discuss this further
when analyzing deadlock in Section 4.
Each of the following definitions applies to both formats. The set of
ballot profiles is B ≡ ×Bi, and a scrutiny is a mapping ϕ : B → N ∪ {0}
that associates each ballot profile x ∈ B with an outcome ϕ(x) ∈ N ∪ {0}
which is either a pope or black smoke. In the literature, what we call a
scrutiny is called a rule.
3.2 Axioms
An axiom is a mathematical property of a scrutiny that captures an idea.
Each of the following axioms has been considered previously in the litera-
ture,27 and is here stated for both the Piusine and Gregorian format—with
26There are many eponymous adjectives associated with popes, such as Petrine for the
cross of Saint Peter, Gregorian for the chant of Gregory I and the calendar of Gregory
XIII, and Sistine for the chapel of Sixtus IV. But to our knowledge, there is no such
adjective for any Pius; we propose Piusine.
27In related models, impartiality was proposed by de Clippel, Moulin, and Tideman
(2008), name independence by Ng and Sun (2003), candidate neutrality by Mackenzie
(2015), and all of our other axioms by Holzman and Moulin (2013). Mihara (1997) is
perhaps the first to define a symmetry axiom using all permutations, except when the
permuted result is inadmissible, in a nontrivial model; he considered an infinite voter
setting where previous works had considered only measurable permutations.
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the exception of positive unanimity, which is stated only for the Gregorian
format.
Our first two axioms capture the principles identified in Section 2: elec-
tors should be protected from temptation due to peers and due to self.
First, an elector’s score is the number of nominations he receives. Given
a ballot profile x ∈ B, write s(x) for the score profile of x, si(x) ≡ |{j ∈
N |xj = i}|. To capture the idea that electors should be protected from
bribes and threats of peers, we require that the outcome can be determined
using only the scores, allowing the scrutiny to be a secret ballot:
Anonymous ballots: For each pair x, x′ ∈ B,
s(x) = s(x′) implies ϕ(x) = ϕ(x′).
Second, a profile of one ballot from each elector except i is written x−i, and
the set of all such profiles is B−i. To capture the idea that electors should
be protected from temptation due to personal ambition, we require that an
elector’s report does not impact whether or not he becomes pope:
Impartiality: For each i ∈ N , each pair xi, x′i ∈ Bi, and each x−i ∈ B−i,
ϕ(xi, x−i) = i ⇔ ϕ(x′i, x−i) = i.
The next axiom captures the idea that ballots are interpreted as nomi-
nations:
Monotonicity: For each pair i, j ∈ N , each x ∈ B, and each x′i ∈ Bi,
ϕ(x) = j and x′i = j ⇒ ϕ(x′i, x−i) = j.
Our next two axioms capture the idea that consensus be respected.
First, if an elector is nominated by all his peers, then he should become
pope. Because we only analyze this axiom when self-nomination is prohib-
ited, we can provide the following simple statement:
Positive unanimity [Gregorian format]: For each i ∈ N and each
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x ∈ B,
si(x) = n− 1 ⇒ ϕ(x) = i.
Second, an elector nominated by nobody should not become pope:
Negative unanimity: For each i ∈ N and each x ∈ B,
si(x) = 0 ⇒ ϕ(x) 6= i.
Our final two axioms capture the idea that electors should be treated
symmetrically. Let SN denote the set of permutations on N and let 1
denote the identity: for each i ∈ N , 1(i) = i. Given x ∈ B and σ, τ ∈ SN ,
let xσ,τ ∈ NN be defined as follows: for each i ∈ N , xσ,τσ(i) ≡ τ(xi). Observe
that for the Gregorian format, x may be a ballot profile while xσ,τ is not,
as there may be some i ∈ N for which xσ,τi = i. First, the scrutiny should
not distinguish between any two electors on the basis of name a priori:
Name independence: For each x ∈ B and each σ ∈ SN ,
ϕ(xσ,σ) = σ(ϕ(x)).
Second, electors should be treated symmetrically insofar as they are can-
didates:28
Candidate neutrality: For each x ∈ B and each σ ∈ SN ,
if x1,σ ∈ B and ϕ(x) ∈ N, then ϕ(x1,σ) = σ(ϕ(x)).
Each of these axioms is satisfied by the scrutiny of Gregory XV. More-
over, while only impartiality and anonymous ballots were specifically iden-
tified from our historical analysis, others are suggestive of conclave tra-
dition. For example, monotonicity is compatible with the word Eligo—“I
choose”—which has been specifically required in scrutinies and other meth-
28The analogous symmetry axiom that requires electors are treated symmetrically
insofar as they are voters (Mackenzie, 2015) is logically equivalent to anonymous ballots
for both the Piusine and Gregorian formats, and the proof is straightforward.
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ods for centuries; positive unanimity is reminiscent of acclamation, a former
method of election where the electors simultaneously and unanimously de-
clare aloud the new pope; and name independence prohibits treating an
elector differently at the start of scrutiny, disallowing both (i) a pope nam-
ing his successor, and (ii) the jus exclusivae, where a secular ruler vetoes
an elector.
3.3 Analysis of Piusine format
We begin by providing several examples of scrutinies in the Piusine format.
First, we introduce the class to which the modern scrutiny belongs, each
member indexed by a threshold:
 Supermajority scrutiny with index t, n ≥ t > n
2
: For each
x ∈ B and each i ∈ N ,
ϕ(x) = i if and only if si(x) ≥ t.
The modern scrutiny has index 2
3
n, while the supermajority scrutiny
with index 2
3
n+ 1 was used in the last century.
Next, we introduce a class of constant scrutinies, each indexed by an
elector who always wins:
 Fixed-winner scrutiny indexed by i ∈ N : For each x ∈ B,
ϕ(x) = i.
In such a scrutiny, the pope is determined without input from the cardi-
nal electors at all. This could happen, for example, if the pope designated
his successor. Though this did happen in the early church,29 the pope has
been selected by the cardinals for nearly a millenium (Pope Nicholas II,
1059).
29For example, it is known that Felix IV designated Boniface II (Pope Felix IV, circa
530).
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Finally, we introduce the constant rule that always selects black smoke:
 Black smoke scrutiny: For each x ∈ B,
ϕ(x) = 0.
This is a scrutiny by definition, though it clearly is of no practical use.
It is clear that the modern scrutiny is not impartial, as an elector can
determine whether or not he is elected when his peers have made him one
vote short of winning. In fact, this defect deeply pervades the modern
format altogether:
Theorem 1: For the Piusine format, an impartial scrutiny satisfies
(i) voter anonymity if and only if it is a fixed-winner scrutiny or the
black smoke scrutiny, and
(ii) candidate neutrality if and only if it is the black smoke scrutiny.
The proof is in the Appendix. Our conclusion is simple: the format of
scrutiny should be changed.
3.4 Analysis of Gregorian format
For the Gregorian format, the definitions of the fixed-winner scrutinies and
the black smoke scrutiny are as written in Section 3.3; the difference is
that the space of ballot profiles B has changed with the prohibition of
self-nomination. There is an additional difference for the definition of the
supermajority scrutiny: the threshold t can no longer be n; it must now
satisfy n − 1 ≥ t > 1
2
n. The scrutiny of 1621-1945 is the member of the
supermajority class with index 2
3
n.
It is clear that each supermajority scrutiny satisfies all of our axioms.
This raises a natural question: does any other scrutiny for the Gregorian
format? The answer is no. In fact, the supermajority class is distinguished
using only some of our axioms, the other axioms implied through logical
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relationships:
Theorem 2: For the Gregorian format, the following are equivalent:
• ϕ is a supermajority scrutiny;
• ϕ satisfies impartiality, monotonicity, positive unanimity, voter anonymity,
and candidate neutrality;
• ϕ satisfies impartiality, monotonicity, positive unanimity, voter anonymity,
and name independence;
• ϕ satisfies impartiality, monotonicity, positive unanimity, candidate
neutrality, and name independence.
Moreover, each of these three characterizations is tight.
The proof is in the Appendix. Within the supermajority class, a rule is
selected by selecting a threshold, and for the Gregorian format, both the
Third Lateran Council and Gregory XV agree that this threshold should
be 2
3
n.
In a similar finding, May (1952) considers the problem of aggregating
rankings over two social alternatives, and proves that simple majority is the
only rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and a strong version of mono-
tonicity. Though we consider rules with larger domains and ranges, similar
axioms nevertheless lead to a small class of similar rules when incentives
are taken into consideration through impartiality. In fact, analogous results
hold for a variety of domain-range settings where agents approve of several
peers and at least one prize, but possibly several, must be awarded (Suzuki
and Horita, working paper, 2016).
Because of our finding, we are able not only to endorse the Gregorian
format on the basis of the principles we have identified, but also to endorse
the specific scrutiny of 1621-1945. That does not necessarily mean that
electors must sign their ballots; we discuss this in the conclusion.
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4 Deadlock
As mentioned earlier, after enough failed scrutinies, the two with the most
nominations in the most recent scrutiny become finalists. Thereafter, at
each deadlock scrutiny, a voter may only nominate a finalist, and this
continues until one of the finalists receives at least two-thirds of the nomi-
nations. There are a few potential concerns with this method.
• The final standard scrutiny may not reveal two finalists. For example,
there could be a four-way tie, or there may be two electors tied for
second place. The current law does not address all possibilities.30
• The conclave is not guaranteed to end by a particular date. When
John Paul II introduced deadlock scrutinies, he required only that a
finalist receive a majority of the votes, essentially guaranteeing the
conclave ends on the date of the first deadlock scrutiny. This meant,
however, that a patient majority of electors could block all standard
scrutinies to make their candidate a finalist and elect him, effectively
removing the two-thirds requirement. This appears to be the reason
that Benedict XVI raised the threshold for deadlock scrutiny to two-
thirds, but the tradeoff is that this reintroduces the possibility that
a conclave could continue indefinitely.
• Narrowing down to two finalists could make compromise difficult. On
some future date, the church may find its electors polarized. In such a
climate, a moderate candidate may best serve the church and protect
it from schism. But such a compromise would be impossible if the
two finalists held positions at opposite extremes.
• Over the course of deadlock scrutinies, one of the finalists may die.
Though remote, this possibility is more likely in a polarized con-
clave that has trouble reaching a consensus—a process which can
take years.31 In this event, does the other finalist become pope? As
30A question related to selecting two finalists is analyzed by Amoro´s (2013), who
considers the problem of designing a mechanism for a biased jury to select a fixed
number of winning contestants. In that setting, however, the jurors and contestants are
different people.
31The longest conclave, which elected Gregory X, lasted from November 1268 to
September 1271.
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the current constitution does not address this, there is room for ar-
gument, which means there is theoretically a circumstance where an
elector might believe he can reach his desired outcome through mur-
der. If one of two finalists in a polarized conclave were to die for
any reason, there would be risk of great damage to the church due to
accusations along these lines—perhaps even schism.
To design a final scrutiny, let us disallow black smoke, requiring that a
pope be selected:
Decisiveness: For each x ∈ B, ϕ(x) ∈ N .
In all its centuries the conclave has never featured such a final scrutiny.
This history is unsurprising, for in fact each final scrutiny is defective ac-
cording to the principles we have identified as evidenced by the following
three findings. First, no such decisive and impartial scrutiny respects con-
sensus:
Theorem HM1 (Holzman and Moulin, 2013): For the Gregorian
format, no decisive, impartial scrutiny satisfies positive unanimity and neg-
ative unanimity.
When our model is interpreted as the assignment of a single indivisi-
ble good among agents who selfishly desire it, black smoke is interpreted
as the destruction of the object, and the requirement that someone be
selected is equivalent to standard efficiency. For this reason, the finding
that these axioms become compatible when it is possible to select nobody
through black smoke—as evidenced by, for example, the supermajority
class—reinforces the finding in various economic models that certain ob-
jectives can be achieved only by relaxing efficiency or destroying goods.32
32For example, when money may be transferred and agents have quasi-linear pref-
erences with respect to money, the VCG mechanisms (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971;
Groves, 1973) are the only strategy-proof and partially efficient mechanisms if the do-
main of admissible valuation function profiles is smoothly-connected (Holmstro¨m, 1979),
and these mechanisms necessarily burn money when all valuation functions are admis-
sible (Green and Laffont, 1979). In the special case that one object is to be allocated,
Sprumont (2013) argues for sometimes destroying the object instead of burning money
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Moreover, this complements the finding that the axioms are compatible
when selecting multiple winners is possible.33 In related work, Bjelde, Fis-
cher, and Klimm (working paper, 2015) consider k prizes to be awarded
using approval ballots, both when they must all be assigned and when this
is not necessary, but instead of proceeding axiomatically they investigate
rules that perform well according to the metric introduced in Fischer and
Klimm (2014).
Second, no decisive and impartial secret ballot uses the nominations at
all:
Theorem HM2 (Holzman and Moulin, 2013): For the Gregorian
format, a decisive, impartial scrutiny satisfies anonymous ballots if and
only if it is a fixed-winner scrutiny.
This is similar to Theorem 1; it becomes possible to use nominations
by allowing the use of black smoke, but this possibility vanishes if self-
nomination is then allowed.
To state the third result, we introduce a class of scrutinies, each indexed
by an elector who alone determines the pope:
 Dictator scrutiny with index i: For each x ∈ B,
ϕ(x) = xi.
The third result is that the only decisive and impartial scrutinies that
treat electors symmetrically as candidates are the dictator scrutinies:
Theorem M1 (Mackenzie, 2015): For the Gregorian format, a decisive,
to distribute surplus more evenly. Other findings along these lines include that an auc-
tioneer seeking to maximize his expected revenue should set a reservation price when
buyer valuations are uncertain (Myerson, 1981), and that discarding redundant goods
without sacrificing efficiency leads to a rich class of desirable rules in classical exchange
economies when agents have Leontief preferences (Li and Xue, 2013).
33In particular, the axioms are compatible whenever there are k prizes, where n ≥
k > 1 (Tamura, working paper, 2016). When there are n prizes, the plurality with
runners-up rule (Tamura and Ohseto, 2014) meets the requirements, provided there are
at least four agents, and this rule even has a characterization in terms of other axioms
(Tamura, 2016).
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impartial scrutiny satisfies candidate neutrality if and only if it is a dictator
scrutiny.
Though this is a negative result, it is not as negative as Theorem 1: the
dictator rules are no longer impartial when self-nomination is allowed even
when black smoke is available.
Taken together, these three findings suggest that there is no acceptable
way to use a “final scrutiny” to determine a pope. But what if random-
ization were involved? Let us say that a chance-scrutiny is a mapping
ϕ : B → ∆(N) that associates each ballot profile with a randomization
over the electors; the black smoke cannot be used. Each axiom has a nat-
ural analogous definition; for formal statements see Mackenzie (2015).
The uniform random dictatorship can be operated as follows. First,
have each elector write the name of his nomination onto a card. Second,
mix these cards in a bowl. Finally, select one of them uniformly at random.
The name on that card is the new pope.
Theorem M2 (Mackenzie, 2015): An impartial chance-scrutiny satis-
fies anonymous ballots and negative unanimity if and only if it is uniform
random dictatorship.
There are several potential criticisms of this method. We respond to
three.
• The pope may not have the support of two-thirds of the electors. This
is true, and therefore this method should only be used as a last resort
if there is wide agreement that such a consensus is impossible. In
this event, the primary concern is schism, which can possibly be ad-
dressed through ceremony. As a proposal, have each elector seal his
nomination card before it is cast. After the winning card is selected,
but before it is opened, all of the other cards are burned. At this
point, each and every elector swears a holy oath to recognize as pope
the man whose name is written on the remaining card. Finally, the
card is opened to reveal the pope.
• An elector nominated by all his peers may not win. There is indeed
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a small chance that instead, the winner will be the nominee of that
elector. This is not a practical concern, as this final method would
only be used in a greatly divided conclave. But if the process is
interpreted as the electors nominating candidates for God to choose,
then this simply means that God always has a choice.
• A pope has never been selected randomly. While this is true to our
knowledge, there is in fact precedent for randomization in the as-
signment of extremely important positions—one must just go back
millennia. As reported in Acts 1:12-26, Saint Peter participates in
prayer when randomization is used to select the apostle to replace
Judas. The excerpt on randomization, from the King James Version
of the Bible:
23 And they appointed [nominated] two, Joseph called Barsabas,
who was surnamed Justus, and Matthias. 24 And they
prayed, and said, Thou, Lord, which knowest the hearts
of all men, shew whether of these two thou hast chosen,
25 That he may take part of this ministry and apostleship,
from which Judas by transgression fell, that he might go
to his own place. 26 And they gave forth their lots; and
the lot fell upon Matthias; and he was numbered with the
eleven apostles.
There are many other ways deadlock could be handled using randomization—
for example, a cardinal could be selected uniformly at random, or scrutiny
could narrow the candidates down to two finalists and then one of the
nominations for them could be randomly selected. Deadlock could also
be handled without randomization—for example, the pope could designate
who his successor should be if the electors cannot reach a consensus. We
simply raise some concerns with the current method and argue that ran-
domization merits consideration.
5 Conclusion
We conclude with a discussion of several additional topics.
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The two-thirds threshold and stability
We characterize the supermajority class, not the 2
3
n scrutiny in par-
ticular. Does this particular threshold have any merit outside of its long
tradition? Surprisingly, yes: the two-thirds threshold is sufficient for a
particular kind of stability.
In particular, given a collection of voters N , a collection of candidates
X, and a profile of voter preferences over X, associate each supermajority
threshold t with a cooperative game as follows: if |S| ≥ t, then S can
achieve any alternative; else S can achieve nothing. For which t is the core
nonempty?
When N is a continuum of voters, X is a compact set in Euclidean issue
space, preferences are Euclidean, and the distribution of peaks over X is
concave, then a threshold of at least 1 − 1
e
, or about 63.2%, guarantees
a nonempty core regardless of the number of issues (Caplin and Nalebuff,
1988). In fact this is true more generally, provided preferences are appro-
priately separable across issues and the distribution appropriately rules out
heavy polarization (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991).
As mentioned earlier, the 2
3
n threshold dates back to the Third Lat-
eran Council, where the priority was protecting the church from schism.
Schism can occur if a coalition of electors attempts to block an elected
pope by crowning their own anti-pope—that is, precisely in the event of
instability. The closeness between the threshold adopted in the twelfth
century and that revealed by modern analysis is striking.
Ballots without signatures
Though a secret ballot was used for over three centuries, nevertheless
the physical ballots featured concealed signatures to enforce the prohibition
against self-nomination. These signatures would be revealed in rare cases,
and if this were a concern, other methods of enforcement could be pursued.
We make one such proposal.34
Suppose there are n electors. Before scrutiny, n identical decks of cards
are printed and packaged. Each deck consists of n distinct cards, each
34This proposal is a slight adaptation of a proposal of Olga Gorelkina.
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bearing the name of an elector. To ensure the decks are printed as specified,
they are placed in a large bowl and mixed. Each elector takes one deck
at random, finds his own card, and finds the card of his nominee. When
he votes, he shows his own card and discards it, then secretly casts his
nominee’s card as his vote, then secretly discards the rest of his cards.
To allow electors to vote for non-electors, each deck might also include
a single blank card, onto which can be hand-written the name of any non-
elector. The hand-written card need not be signed; it can simply be verified
that it does not name an elector.
Future directions
A few other articles analyze papal elections using the tools of economic
theory. Colomer and McLean (1998) use results in social choice theory to
explain some of the changes in papal elections throughout history, empha-
sizing the use of approval voting, and moreover include a particular strong
collection of primary sources. Ko´czy and Sziklai (2015) consider the 2013
conclave and calculate the Shapley-Shubik index of each elector in a simple
game whose winning coalitions are based on where the electors were born
and how conservative they are by a particular measure; they find that the
winner, known today as Pope Francis, ranks third.
In this article, our analysis has focused on scrutiny when each elector
nominates one person, but there are other formats that could be considered.
Moreover, we have not attempted to model the evolution of opinions due to
observing inconclusive scrutiny results, praying, and communicating with
peers. These are interesting topics for future research.
Appendix
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 1, Proposition 2.1, Proposition 2.2,
and Theorem 2. The following two lemmas simplify our analysis:
Lemma HM (Holzman and Moulin, 2013): For both formats, if ϕ is
an impartial scrutiny satisfying voter anonymity, then for each i ∈ N and
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each pair x, x′ ∈ B such that si(x) = si(x′),
ϕ(x) = i if and only if ϕ(x′) = i.
Lemma M (Mackenzie, 2015): For both formats, if ϕ is an impartial
scrutiny satisfying candidate neutrality, then for each N0 ⊆ N and each
pair x, x′ ∈ B such that there are i, i′ ∈ N with {j ∈ N |xj = i} = {j ∈
N |x′j = i′} = N0,
ϕ(x) = i if and only if ϕ(x′) = i′.
Though the cited proofs specifically regard the Gregorian setting when
black smoke cannot be selected, they readily support the above statements
with trivial modifications. The introduction of black smoke has no impact
on either argument, and turning to the Piusine setting allows the lemmas
to be established with even simpler arguments. We therefore omit these
proofs.
Theorem 1: For the Piusine format, an impartial scrutiny satisfies
(i) voter anonymity if and only if it is a fixed-winner scrutiny or the
black smoke scrutiny, and
(ii) candidate neutrality if and only if it is the black smoke scrutiny.
Proof: We prove the parts in sequence.
(i) Let i ∈ N . By Lemma HM, there is Vi ⊆ {0, 1, ..., n} such that for
each x ∈ B, ϕ(x) = i if and only if si(x) ∈ Vi.
Assume there is v ∈ Vi\{n}. Let x ∈ B be such that si(x) = v and
xi 6= i, and define x′ ∈ B by: x′i ≡ i, and for each j ∈ N\{i}, x′j ≡ xj.
Then si(x) ∈ Vi, so ϕ(x) = i, and then by impartiality ϕ(x′) = i, so
si(x) = v + 1 ∈ Vi.
By a similar argument, v ∈ Vi\{0} implies v − 1 ∈ Vi, so either Vi = ∅
or Vi = {0, 1, ..., n}. Since i ∈ N was arbitrary, this is true for each elector.
There cannot be distinct i, j ∈ N such that Vi = Vj = {0, 1, ..., n}, else for
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each x ∈ B, i = ϕ(x) = j, contradicting that i and j are distinct. Because
there is at most one i ∈ N for which Vi = {0, 1, ..., n}, and because for any
other j ∈ N , Vj = ∅, it follows that ϕ is a constant scrutiny.
(ii) For each x ∈ B and each i ∈ N , define x−1i ≡ {j ∈ N |xj = i}. By
Lemma M, there is D ⊆ 2N such that for each i ∈ N and each x ∈ B,
ϕ(x) = i if and only if x−1i ∈ D.
Assume, by way of contradiction, there is nonempty D ∈ D. Let i ∈ D,
let j ∈ N\{i}, and define x ∈ B by: (i) for each k ∈ D, xk ≡ i, and (ii)
for each k ∈ N\D, xk ≡ j. Define x′ ∈ B by: x′i ≡ j, and for each k ∈ N ,
x′k ≡ xk. Since D ∈ D, thus ϕ(x) = i, so by impartiality ϕ(x′) = i, so
D\{i} ∈ D. Since nonempty D ∈ D and i ∈ D, were arbitrary, it follows
that ∅ ∈ D.
Let i, j, k ∈ N be distinct, and let x ∈ B be the profile where each
elector designates i. Since x−1j = x
−1
k = ∅ ∈ D, thus j = ϕ(x) = k,
contradicting that j and k are distinct. Because a nonempty D ∈ D implies
∅ ∈ D, which is not possible, thusD = ∅, so ϕ is the black smoke scrutiny.
Our next proposition involves the following class of scrutinies:
 Restricted unanimity scrutiny indexed by N ′: An elector
wins if and only if he is in N ′ and he is nominated by all his peers.
Proposition 2.1: For the Gregorian format, an impartial scrutiny satis-
fies monotonicity, voter anonymity, and candidate neutrality if and only if
it is a supermajority scrutiny, a restricted unanimity scrutiny, or the black
smoke scrutiny.
Proof: We omit the straightforward verification of axioms. By Lemma HM,
for each i ∈ N , there is Vi ⊆ {0, 1, ..., n− 1} such that ϕ(x) = i if and only
if si(x) ∈ Vi.
Case 1: There is i ∈ N such that Vi\{n− 1} 6= ∅. Define v ≡ minVi; note
that v ≤ n − 2. Let j ∈ N\{i}, and let S ⊆ N\{i, j} such that |S| = v.
Define x ∈ B by: (i) for each k ∈ S, xk ≡ i, (ii) for each k ∈ N\(S∪{i, j}),
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xk ≡ j, and (iii) xi = xj ≡ minN\{i, j}. Let σ be the transposition of i and
j, and define x′ ∈ B by: for each k ∈ N , x′k ≡ σ(xk). Then si(x) = v ∈ Vi,
so ϕ(x) = i, so by candidate neutrality ϕ(x′) = j, so v ∈ Vj.
Since i ∈ N and v ∈ Vi\{n − 1} were arbitrary, thus for each pair
i, j ∈ N , minVi = minVj. By monotonicity, there is v∗ ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1}
such that for each i ∈ N , Vi = {v∗, v∗ + 1, ..., n − 1}. It cannot be that
v∗ ≤ n
2
, else at any profile where two electors have score v∗, both of those
electors would be selected, which is impossible. Thus ϕ is a supermajority
scrutiny.
Case 2: For each i ∈ N , Vi\{n−1} = ∅. DefineW ≡ {i ∈ N |Vi = {n−1}}.
If W 6= ∅, then ϕ is a restricted unanimity scrutiny; if W = ∅, then ϕ is
the black smoke scrutiny. 
Proposition 2.2: For the Gregorian format, the following are equivalent:
• ϕ is either a supermajority scrutiny or the black smoke scrutiny;
• ϕ satisfies impartiality, monotonicity, name independence, and voter
anonymity;
• ϕ satisfies impartiality, monotonicity, name independence, and can-
didate neutrality.
Proof: This is immediate from Proposition 2.1, since in the Gregorian
setting, (i) name independence and voter anonymity imply candidate neu-
trality, and (ii) name independence and candidate neutrality imply voter
anonymity. 
Theorem 2: For the Gregorian format, the following are equivalent:
• ϕ is a supermajority scrutiny;
• ϕ satisfies impartiality, monotonicity, positive unanimity, voter anonymity,
and candidate neutrality;
• ϕ satisfies impartiality, monotonicity, positive unanimity, voter anonymity,
and name independence;
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• ϕ satisfies impartiality, monotonicity, positive unanimity, candidate
neutrality, and name independence.
Moreover, each of these three characterizations is tight.
Proof: The characterizations are immediate from Proposition 2.1 and
Proposition 2.2, since each acclaim scrutiny and the black smoke scrutiny
violates positive unanimity.
To establish tightness of the three characterizations, we provide, for each
axiom, an example of a scrutiny satisfying all other axioms used in any of
the characterizations. In addition to the scrutinies defined in Section 3, we
introduce the following, favoring plain language over mathematical formal-
ity for clarity:
 Acclaim unless a twice-designated peer: An elector wins if
and only if he is nominated by at least n− 2 peers and none of his peers is
nominated twice.
 Majority unless one dissenter: An elector wins if and only if
he is nominated by over half his peers and not by n− 2 peers.
 Weighted majority scrutiny indexed by (wi): Elector i wins
if and only if∑
{j∈N |xj=i}wj >
∑
wj
2
.
 Personalized threshold scrutiny indexed by (vi), min vi +
vj > n: Elector i wins if and only if he receives at least vi nominations.
 Majority without multiple opponents: Elector i wins if and
only if (i) he receives over
n
2
nominations, and (ii) there is at most one
other elector who is nominated by one of i’s peers.
These examples apply across the three characterizations:
Impartiality: Acclaim unless a twice-designated peer, provided there are
30
five or more electors.
Monotonicity: Majority unless one dissenter, provided there are five or
more electors.
Positive unanimity: Black smoke scrutiny.
For the first characterization:
Voter anonymity: Weighted majority, provided there are four or more
electors.
Candidate neutrality: Personalized threshold scrutiny.
For the second characterization:
Voter anonymity: Majority without multiple opponents.
Name independence: Personalized threshold scrutiny.
For the third characterization:
Candidate neutrality: Majority without multiple opponents.
Name independence: Weighted majority, provided there are four or
more electors. 
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